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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF COLUMBIA
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Petitioner,
against

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION,
BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner of New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision,
NEW YORK BOARD OF PAROLE, ANDREA W.
EVANS, Chairwoman of the New York Board of Parole,

AFFIRMATION IN
OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO DISMISS
AND IN FURTHER
SUPPORT OF
VERIFIED PETITION

Respondents,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice
Law and Rules.

Orlee Goldfeld, an attorney admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of New
York, affmns the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106:
been asking for a lawful parole hearing for

1.

more than a year now, and Respondents have used every delay tactic possible to deny him. To
date, he has appeared before the Parole Board five times, 1 and he has had three parole hearings,
none of which was conducted in accordance with the law. He has filed three administrative
2

appeals .and two previous Article 78 proceedings, raising the same issues as those herein. At
this point, Mr. -

has served more than 25 months, well beyond the guideline range of 12-18

1
On two of those occasions, the paro
commissioners did not bring with them Mr.
themselves with no explanation.
2

·ssioners discontinued the hearing, once because the
file, and the other because two of the commissioners recused

None has been decided on the merits (Exh. Thereto, collecting decisions of administrative appeals and
1
previous Article 78 proceedings; see also Exhibits N and S to the Goldfeld Affi.nnation, executed on the 5 ll day of
March 2013, previously filed in this proceeding in support of the Verified Petition (''Goldfeld Aff." )). The
administrative appeal ofMr.
November 2012 is pending.
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months shown on his Inmate Status Report. He completed his minimum sentence 9 months ago.
He has no prior criminal history and no disciplinary infractions while in prison. One is left to
wonder what, if any, legitimate basis and purpose there is for his continued incarceration. 3
2.

I am Of Counsel to the firm of Hollyer Brady LLP, counsel for Mr. -

make this affirmation in opposition to Respondents' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR
32ll(a)(7) ("Motion") and in further support ofMr.~erified Petition ("Petition"),

Mr.- -

seeking inter alia an Order (1) vacating Respondents' unlawful determination denying Mr.
-

parole application and (2) directing Respondents immediately to release

to conduct a new parole hearing in accordance with the laws of the State ofNew York, and other
relief specified in the Petition. The statements herein are true to my knowledge, except as to
those matters alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIES
3.

Respondents make a half-hearted attempt to deny the applicability of the

exception to the mootness doctrine, since they concede that two of the three factors are present in

this case.
4.

First, Respondents do not deny - nor can they- the likelihood of repetition,

because the very issues raised in the Petition already reoccurred at Mr. ~ovember 2012
parole bearing. These issues will undoubtedly reoccur again at his next scheduled hearing in
August 2013. Thus, this factor of the exception is established.

MI.continued incarceration is so important to Respondents lhat they leaked the transcript of his
first parole hearing to the media the day after lhe hearing (Exh. U hereto), and they issued a press release stating that
he was a~>ain denied parole in November 2012 (Exh. V hereto). On the same day, they issued a press release that
as granted parole (available at
tp
occs.ny.gov/PressRel/20 12/Hevesi_Granted_Parole.html>).
-

2
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5.

Second, Respondents do not deny that this issue repeatedly evades judicial

review, because they have successfully thwarted judicial oversight of their actions for more than
a year now, and they have the unilateral power to continue to do so. In order to prevent a court's

Mr.-

examination of their actions, all Respondents need to do (and have done) is schedule another
unlawful parole hearing, and then oppose any petition or appeal on the grounds that

Mr.-

claims are mooted by virtue of the later hearing. Respondents are also under no obligation to
rule on

administrative appeals, and simply ignore them (Exhibit Thereto and

Goldfeld Aff. Exhs. N and S). Thus, this factor of the exception to the mootness doctrine is also
established.
6.

Instead, Respondents commit the majority of their Motion trying to persuade the

Court that the issues raised in the Petition are not substantial or novel, even though Respondents
concede that no appellate court has determined whether Respondents have complied with the
legislative amendments that went into effect on October 1, 2011.
7.

The cases cited in their Motion (O'Donnell Affirmation ("Aff")" 10) are

inapposite. First, in Matter ofAmen v. New York State Division ofParole, 100 A.D.3d 1230 (3d
Dep't 2012), a case in which the inmate appeared for a parole hearing before the statutory
amendments became effective, the court stated: "petitioner's argument regarding the retroactive
application of recent amendments to Executive Law§ 259-c(4) is not preserved for our review."
In Matter ofHamilton v. New York State Division ofParole, 101 A.D.3d 1549 (3d Dep't 2012),
the Court makes no mention of Executive Law§ 259-c(4). The Hamilton case has no bearing on
the issues raised herein, since the denial of Hamilton's parole was made in November 2010well before the amendment to Executive Law § 259-c(4).

3
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8.

As set forth herein, the issues raised in the Petition are novel and substantial,

including whether the decision to keep Mr. -

incarcerated was irrational bordering on

impropriety, and merit this Court's review under an exception to the mootness doctrine.
RESPONDENTS CONTINUE TO IGNORE THE
AMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE LAW§ 259-c(4)
9.

Quite remarkably, Respondents try to paint a picture that the amendments to

Executive Law§ 259-c(4) and Correction Law§ 71-a that became effective in October 2011
were of little or no consequence.
10.

For example, they gloss over the change in the language in Section 259-c(4)

(emphases added):
Pre-Amendment Executive Law§ 259-c(4)

Amended Executive Law§ 259·c(4)

"Establish written guidelines for its use in
making Parole Board decisions as required by
law, including the fixing of minimum periods
of imprisonment or ranges thereof of different
categories of offenders. Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a "risk and
needs assessment" to assist members of the
state Board of Parole in determining which
inmates may be released to parole
supervision."

''Establish written procedures for its use in
making Parole Board decisions as required by
law. Such written procedures shall
incor12orate risk and needs urinciules to
measure the rehabilitation o1' [!Crsons
appearing before the board, th e likelihood of
success of such persons uuon release and
assist members of the state Board of Parole in
determining which inmates may be released to
parole supervision."

11.

The change to the language of the statute is significant, moving from guidelines to

procedures that incorporate risk and needs principles to measure rehabilitation and likelihood of
success, and cannot be ignored.
12.

It is disingenuous at best for Respondents to feign no understanding of the

meaning of"risk and needs principles" (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 15), given that Respondents and-

both testified about them at the Committee Hearing (Goldfeld Exh. K), and risk and

needs principles have been studied in the field of corrections for decades.
4

.
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Correction Law § 112(4), which was also amended on March 1, 2011, provides:
commissioner and the chair of the parole board shall work jointly to develop and
tm}:HerneiJtt, as soon as practicable, a risk and needs assessment instrument or instruments,
shall be empirically validated, that would be administered to inmates upon
reception into a correctional facility, and throughout their incarceration and release
to community supervision, to facilitate appropriate programming both during an inmate's
incarceration and community supervision, and designed to facilitate the successful
integration of inmates into the community.
Are we to believe that they don't understand what "risk and needs" means in this statute either?
14.

In addition to claiming to not understand the meaning of "risk and needs

principles," Respondents remarkably state: "Executive Law§ 259-c(4) dictates neither how new
'written procedures' are to be established, nor in what manner 'risk and needs principles' are to
be incorporated within them." (O'Donnell Aff.
15.

~

15).

This statement suggests that Respondents have no understanding of the structure

of government or the responsibility imposed on them as an administrative agency by New York's
Constitution, the Executive Law, and the State Administrative Procedures Act ("SAPA"). Thus:
a. Executive Law § 259-c( 11) states that the Board shall:
make rules for the conduct of its work, a copy of such rules and of any
amendments thereto to be filed by the chairman with the secretary of state.
b. Article IV, Section 8 ofthe New York State Constitution provides:
No rule or regulation made by any state department, board, bureau, officer,
authority or commission, except such as relates to the organization or internal
management of a state department, board, bureau, authority or commission shall
be effective until it is filed in the office of the department of state ....
c. Executive Law§ 101-a provides the definitions and requirements for agency rule
making, and Executi~e Law § 102 includes the requirements of filing and
publication by the secretary of state.

5
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d. SAPA § 203(]) requires that rules. and official procedures of state agencies and
boards be published in the state register by flrst sending a notice of proposed
rulemaking (SAP A § 202( 1)) and then by filing a notice of adoption along with
the rule for publication (SAP A § 202(5)}.
16.

Administrative agencies are tasked with developing rules, which includes

"procedures" (see SAPA § 102(2)(a)(i)), that are consistent with their enabling legislation.
17.

Respondents had a deadline of October 1, 2011 to comply with amended

•

Executive Law§ 259-c(4) in accordance with the above-listed procedures. They didn't.
THE EVANS MEMORANDUM lS NOT THE REQUISITE PROCEDURES
18.

Respondents try to establish their compliance with Executive Law § 259-c(4) by

pointing to the Evans Memorandum (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 17 and Exh. B thereto). While not
stating outright that the Evans Memorandum is the procedures, Respondents claim that it "serves

as" the Procedures (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 17). "Serve as" is not the same as "is."
19.

First, neither the Evans Memorandum, nor anything else purporting to constitute

the procedures required by the statute, is in Title 9 ofNYCRR Part 8000, where the rules and
regulations that implement and govern the functions, powers and duties of the Parole Board are
required to be set forth. See 9 NYCRR § 8000.1. Second, neither the Evans Memorandum, nor
anything else purporting to constitute the procedures required by the statute, has been filed with
the Secretary of State. If the Evans Memorandum actually constituted the required procedures,
its filing with the Secretary of State would be mandatory, and the Respondents' failure to do so
renders their parole decision arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d 24,
28 (1979).

6
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20.

Moreover, the Evans Memorandum amounts to nothing more than an

acknowledgment that the Executive Law had been amended. Chairwoman Evans herself
acknowledged in her testimony a month after she wrote the Memorandum that the procedures
have not yet been developed (Exhibit K to Goldfeld Affirmation in Support of Verified Petition,
dated March 5, 2013 ("Goldfeld Aff.")).
21.

In addition, in a response to a FOIL request by former Chairman of the Parole

Board Edward Hammock, Respondents stated onApril18, 2012 as follows:
The written procedures to be implemented pursuant to the amendment of Executive Law
§259-c(4) are currently being developed by the Board and Department staff.
(Exhibit Whereto (emphasis added)). This carne 6 months after Respondent Evans wrote her
Memorandum, and further goes to prove that it is not the procedures.
22.

In order to try to bamboozle the Court into believing that the Evans Memorandum

"serves as the procedures referenced in the amended Executive Law§ 259-c(4)," Resp<:>ndents
append a group of recent trial court decisions that found that the Evans Memorandum is the
procedures (O'Donnell Aff. Ex.hs C-F). 4
23.

None of the decisions relied upon by Respondents even mentions Executive Law

§§ 101 -a, 102, 259-c(4), 259-(c)(l l), SAPA §§ 201-207, and New York State Constitution,
Article IV, § 8, and they therefore do not establish that the Evans Memorandum suffices to
comply \\ith these laws.
24.

It is unlikely that the prose petitioners even raised these arguments, given that it

is not bard to imagine that pro se inmates have limited or no access to the legal resources
required to ascertain the full scope the Board's and DOCCS's obligations under these laws.
Noticeably absent is the decision in Cotto v. Evans, No. 139796,2013 WL 486508, 2013 NY Slip Op
30222[U] (St. Lawrence Cty. Jan. 22, 201 3), which found "nothing in the record to suggest that the written
procedures mandated by the amended version of Executive Law§ 259-c(4) were established." (Goldfeld Aff. Exh.
P).

7
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25.

In addition, all of the pro se inmates in Respondents' cases are incarcerated for

Mr-

committing heinous, violent crimes- some while they were on parole. None of those inmates'
offenses is remotely similar to

situation: a first-time non-violent offender of a

single E-Felony with no prior criminal history and no disciplinary infractions while in prison.
26.

Thus, these cases are not dispositive.

TAPANDCOMPAS
27.

Maintaining their posture of "business as usual," Respondents take the position

that the March 2011 amendments did not change the law and that they were not even required to
prepare a TAP for Mr. Sheet and Respondents

(O'Donnell

Aff., 23). This position contradicts DOCCS's Fact
testimony, see generally Petition~~ 72-78, and begs

the following questions:
28.

Why did the Legislature and Governor approve a change to the law? What was

the purpose of the amendment to the statute requiring the development of the TAP (see
Correction Law§ 71-a and Executive Law§ 112(4))? Why were Respondents· · · · ·
-

called to testify about the amendments and the status of their compliance therewith before

the Assembly Committee on Correction (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. K)? Why did DOCCS develop the
TAP and pilot it in three correctional facilities (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. Kat 19-20)?
29.

According to the Evans Memorandum, the TAP "instrument, which incorporates

risk and needs principles, will provide a meaningful measurement of an inmate 's rehabilitation."
The amendment to Executive Law§ 259-c(4) requires procedures that "shall incorporate risk and
needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board" and the
likelihood of success upon release. Nothing in the Executive Law or the Evans Memorandum
says that an Inmate Statu~ Report measmes sebabilitati on ~d likelihood of success UEOn releass_

8

FUSL000031

and presumably it does not because the law was amended to provide for development of an
instrurnent(s) that measures rehabilitation (Executive Law§ 112(4)).
How can there have been compliance with the statute if nothing was used to

30.
measure Mr. -

rehabilitation or likelihood of success and no TAP was required to be

developed, as Respondents assert (O'Donnell Aff. ~ 23)? Use of the Inmate Status Report as
suggested in the Evans Memorandum does not comply with the statutory requirements of
Executive Law§ 259-c(4) and renders Mr. 31.

arole bearing unlawful.

While Respondents have discretion in making parole determinations, that

discretion is neither unlimited nor immune from judicial scrutiny. Discretionary parole release
determinations are reviewable if they are not done in accordance with law and/or if there is a
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See, e.g., Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470
(2000); Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 (3d Dep't 2006); Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614 (3d
Dep' t 2006).
32.

Correction Law§ 805 provided Mr. -

with a presumptive right to~

___.,- ~

released as of June 18, 2012, due to his receipt of a Certificate of Earned Eligibility (cEE").

The only discretion that Respondents had was limited to making a lawful detem'lination that, if
is likely to reoffend and that rus release is not compatible with the welfare

released, Mr. -

of society. That determination was supposed to be made in accordance with New York Statutes
and based upon the evidentiary record before Respondents. 5 It wasn't.
33.

Respondents take the position that they are not even required to prepare a

COMPAS for Mr. -

(O'Donnell Aff. ~ 25). Nothing in the Evans Memorandum suggests

5
Nothing submitted in support of Respondents' Motion suggests that the Commissioners bad any evidentiary
basis for denying Mr. parole application or any facts that contradicted the overwhelming evidence in
support of his release, which fwther supports his claim that the Respondents action was irrational bordering on
impropriety.

9
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that a COMPAS is the instrument that incorporates risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons or likelihood of success upon release.
In fact, the Evans Memorandum does not set forth any procedures for use of the

34.

COMPAS. The only mention about COMPAS is that training was afforded to board members

Mr.-

about its usage in relation to aTAP. A statement that training was offered is not a procedure.
35.

has no previous criminal history, no disciplinary infractions, and has

agreed to life-long penalties that prevent him from committing any securities-related crime in the
future (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. A). Mr. -

COMPAS showed the lowest possible risk of

reoffending (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. F). 6
36.

With no procedures in place that tell the Board how to assess

Mr.-

risks

and needs, the Board could not rationally fmd a reasonable probability that Mr.
reoffend. The Evans Memorandum offers no guidance and certainly no procedures on how to
apply the COMPAS.
What is the procedure when there is no TAP and a there is a CEE, as in Mr.

37.
-

case?
38.

What is the procedure when an inmate like Mr. -

has a CEE and the

COMPAS shows the lowest possible risk level of reoffending?
39.

Quite clearly, the Evans Memorandum is not the procedures required by

Executive Law§ 259-c(4).
40.

How is the Court even supposed to detennine if a decision denying parole to an

inmate with a CEE and the lowest risk level on the COMPAS was made in accordance with the
6

PerhaP.s in an attempt to create an issue about his success upon release, Respondents' redacted three
sections of Mr. COMPAS on the copy they attached to the Motion (O'Donnell Aff. Exh. G): #24
(substance abuse risk), #29 (employability upon release), and #30 (financial problems upon release). Mr.• •
attached an unredacted COMP AS to the Petition, which shows that he is not at risk for substance abuse problems,
and that there are no employability or financial problems upon release (Goldfeld Aff. Exh. F).
10
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law when Respondents have knowingly and admittedly failed to establish procedures for making
such determination?
41.

procedures is tantamount to never even giving
42.

Mr.-

Respondents' decision denying parole in the absence of the required written
lawful hearing in the first place.

parole hearing without written procedures and without a TAP for
43.

Mr. -

They acted beyond the scope oftheir power in conducting the August 21 , 2012

Respondents also acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and so irrationally that their

actions border on impropriety based on the overwhelming evidence that Mr

has the

lowest possible risk to reoffend including his: Certificate of Earned Eligibility, COMPAS score,
no previous criminal history, age, payment of $19 million to the Common Pension Fund, and the
imposition of life-long bans and prohibitions making it impossible for him to commit any
securities-related crime in the future. See generally Petition, 19-2 I, 27-31.
44.

Accordingly, the issue of whether Respondents acted in compliance with the 2011

amendments to the Executive and Correction Laws is substantial and novel and should be
considered by this Court as an exception to the mootness doctrine. The Motion should be denied.
RESPONDENTS DID NOT SERVE THE MOTION

45.

The Motion shouJd also be denied due to Respondents' failure to serve in

accordance with the CPLR.
46.

According to their Affidavit of Service, Respondents served a copy of their

Motion directly upon Mr. -

by maiJ on March 22,2013. Mr. -

received the papers on

the afternoon ofMarch 26, 2013. He was unable to reach his counsel until the morning of March
27, 2013 to advise that a Motion returnable March 29, 2013 bad been made.

ll
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47.

Mr. -

counsel immediately contacted Respondents' counsel, Brian J.

O'Donnell, who admitted that service had not been effectuated properly. Mr. O'Donnell sent a
copy of the Motion papers by email at !0:44a.m. on March 27, 2013 (Exhibit X hereto).
48.

This purported service does not comply with either: CPLR 2214(b) ("A notice of

motion and supporting affidavits shall be served at least eight days before the time at which the
motion is noticed to be heard."); CPLR 21 03(b) (requiring service upon an attorney for a
represented party); CPLR 2103(c) (requiring the addition of five days for mail service upon a
party); or the Administrative Rules of the Unified Court System (no order of the Chief
Administrative Judge allowing electronic service in Article 78 proceedings pending in Columbia
County).
49.

Accordingly, the Motion is defective and should be denied on procedural grounds.
ANSWER WITHIN FIVE DAYS

50.

Respondents should be required to answer the Petition within five (5) days of the

denial ofthe Motion in accordance with CPLR 7804(f).
51.

Here, Respondents ask for 30 days to answer. There is no justification for

needing 30 days to answer, and Respondents set forth no basis for requiring so much time. In
fact, Respondents have already addressed the bulk of the Petition's arguments regarding
Executive Law § 259-c(4) and Correction Law § 71-a in the
52.

Mr.-

Motion.~

Balancing the harms that will be caused by an extension of time shows the

irreparable damage to

Every day that Mr.~pends incarcerated beyond his

Minimum Sentence Date causes irreparable harm, as that time can never be recaptured. On the
other hand, Respondents can show no harm by being required to act in accordance with the
CPLR.

12
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53.

Moreover, Respondents are represented in this case by Mr. O'Donnell, who

apparently worked on the Ortiz case (O'Donnell Aff. Exh. D). The Ortiz case raised issues
similar to those raised herein, which Mr. O'Donnell characterizes as "not substantial"
(O'Donnell Aff.

Mr. -

~ 7).

Therefore, Mr. O'Donnell is more than adequately prepared to respond to

substantive arguments in a timely fashion.
54.

Respondents' request for a period of time far greater than that accorded by the

CPLR to answer the Petition should be denied.

CONCLUSION

Mr.

requests that the Court deny Respondents' Motion to Dismiss,

order Respondents to answer within five days, and then enter Judgment pursuant to .Article 78 of
the CPLR for the relief requested in the Petition, and grant such other and further relief as may
be deemed just and proper.

lf.bub~

Dated: New York, New York
Aprill, 2013

ee Goldfeld, Esq.
HOLL YER BRADY LLP
60 East 42°d Street, Suite 1825
New York, New York 10165
Tel: (212) 706-0248
Fax: (646) 652-5336
goldfeld@hollyerbrady.com
Attorneys for Petitioner
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